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IDEA THEFT AND INDEPENDENT CREATION: 
A RECIPE FOR EVADING  
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 
Jonathan Richard Sandler*
 
Ideas are valuable, especially in Hollywood, and those who rely on 
their ideas for income need protection. Because ideas are not protected 
by federal copyright law, the solution in California has been to protect 
idea disclosure with implied-in-fact contracts. A common defense to a 
claim of idea theft is the independent-creation defense. This defense 
permits an idea recipient to escape liability by showing that he did not 
use a plaintiff’s idea but instead used an idea from an independent third 
party. The problem with this defense, however, is that it fails to 
recognize the possibility that an idea recipient could actually be using 
the idea from both the idea purveyor and the independent third party 
simultaneously. As a result, defendants can wrongfully evade one valid 
implied-in-fact contractual obligation by demonstrating that they 
simply have a second contract. This Note proposes a change to the 
analysis that courts currently apply in implied-in-fact contract claims, 
which will remedy this practice and ensure better protection of idea 
purveyors’ rights. 
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Bryan D. Hull for their academic guidance. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Ideas have value. Every day hundreds, if not thousands, of 
people develop ideas and attempt to sell them to entertainment 
companies.
1
 Such people are known as idea purveyors.
2
 Given that 
idea purveyors rely on the sale of their ideas for their livelihood, the 
law affords them protection in the event that someone uses one of 
those ideas but refuses to pay for it.
3
 Though not protected by 
copyright
4
 or recognized as property
5
 in California, ideas are 
protected through either express or implied-in-fact contracts.
6
 
Disputes arise, however, when two independent parties contract 
with the same idea recipient
7
 and disclose seemingly identical ideas. 
The logical assumption would be that one could determine which 
purveyor’s idea was actually used—and which was discarded—thus 
establishing to whom payment is owed. Such logic is absent from the 
current body of California law, however.
8
 California law affords 
protection to ideas but does not require novelty or concreteness;
9
 
therefore, two idea purveyors could conceivably contract with the 
same company for the sale of the “same” idea. Because the ideas are 
 
 1. Arthur R. Miller, Common Law Protection for Products of the Mind: An “Idea” Whose 
Time Has Come, 119 HARV. L. REV. 703, 714 (2006); see generally Glen L. Kulik, The Idea 
Submission Case: When Is an Idea Protected Under California Law?, 32 BEVERLY HILLS B. 
ASS’N J. 99 (1998) (discussing the different protections afforded idea purveyors in the 
entertainment industry). 
 2. See Blaustein v. Burton, 88 Cal. Rptr. 319, 333 (Ct. App. 1970); Aileen Brophy, Whose 
Idea Is It Anyway? Protecting Idea Purveyors and Media Producers After Grosso v. Miramax, 23 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 507 (2005). 
 3. Miller, supra note 1, at 711; see Jay Rubin, Television Formats: Caught in the Abyss of 
the Idea/Expression Dichotomy, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 661, 697 
(2006). 
 4. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 19D.01 (2011). 
 5. Id. § 19D.02; Camilla M. Jackson, “I’ve Got This Great Idea for a Movie!” A 
Comparison of the Laws in California and New York that Protect Idea Submissions, 21 COLUM.-
VLA J.L. & ARTS 47, 52 (1996). 
 6. Blaustein, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 331. 
 7. “Idea recipient” is an industry term for a person to whom an idea purveyor pitches his 
idea. See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.06; Miller, supra note 1, at 724. 
 8. See infra text accompanying note 193. 
 9. Blaustein, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 334; Minniear v. Tors, 72 Cal. Rptr. 287, 293 (Ct. App. 1968); 
43 CAL. JUR. 3D Literary and Artistic Property § 15 (2011); Kulik, supra note 1, at 105; Celine 
Michaud & Gregory Tulquois, Idea Men Should Be Able to Enforce Their Contractual Rights 
Considerations Rejecting Preemption of Idea-Submission Contract Claims, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & 
PRAC. 75, 77 (2003). 
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identical, there is no way for a finder of fact to consistently 
determine which idea was actually used to create the new work. 
However, idea recipients have developed what appears to be an 
effective defense to claims of unlawful use—the independent-
creation defense. This defense, in theory, enables an idea recipient to 
show that he has used one idea and not another.
10
 The problem is that 
the independent-creation defense is misplaced in contract law, and 
even when it is applied correctly, it fails to acknowledge and uphold 
an idea purveyor’s contractual rights.
11
 Further, California courts 
have misapplied this defense in a way that threatens to undermine the 
law of ideas and deny purveyors any and all protection.
12
 Simply put, 
the independent-creation defense permits an idea recipient to destroy 
one valid contract by merely showing that he has contracted with 
another party for the disclosure of the same idea.
13
 
This Note summarizes the present state of California idea-
protection law and attempts to resolve the inconsistencies that the 
independent-creation defense has created. Part II describes the state 
laws that protect ideas, as federal law offers no such protection. Part 
III explains the most common method of state protection for idea 
disclosure—the implied-in-fact contract—focusing on the element of 
actual use. Part IV analyzes the development of the independent-
creation defense in the contract context and highlights the ways in 
which it has been both misinterpreted and misapplied. Part V offers 
two proposals to reshape the independent-creation defense so that it 
better protects idea recipients who have engaged in no misconduct 
and does not deny relief to purveyors deserving recovery. The first 
proposal suggests changes to the analysis that courts currently apply 
to implied-in-fact contract claims, while the second proposal, 
instead, recommends changes to the effect of the independent-
creation defense and the remedies to which one is entitled. Finally, 
Part VI concludes that adopting the first proposed solution, alteration 
 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 44–51. 
 11. THOMAS D. SELZ ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAW 3D: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND BUSINESS 
§ 15:6 (3d ed. 2011). 
 12. See infra Part IV. It is not only the idea purveyor whose rights are afforded inadequate 
protection by the independent-creation defense; idea recipients’ rights are vulnerable as well. 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
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of the courts’ analysis, will result in the best protection for all parties 
involved in idea-submission claims. 
II.  STATE LAWS, NOT FEDERAL LAWS, 
PROTECT IDEAS 
Generally, federal statutes protect products of the mind—for 
example, patent, trademark, copyright, trade secret, and unfair 
competition statutes.
14
 Federal law does not, however, protect 
ideas.
15
 Instead, state laws offer such protection.
16
 Copyright, the 
standard federal protection for artistic works, explicitly denies ideas 
any protection.
17
 However, courts have recognized that ideas fixed in 
a tangible medium are within the subject matter of copyright, despite 
not being protected by it.
18
 Nevertheless, the Copyright Office has 
made it clear that the intent of federal Copyright Law is to not 
protect general ideas or outlines.
19
 As a matter of policy, Congress 
has decided not to extend federal protection to ideas.
20
 Thus, those 
seeking to recover in idea-submission disputes have historically 
relied on various state legal theories to protect their ideas.
21
 In recent 
 
 14. Jackson, supra note 5, at 47; Miller, supra note 1, at 717. 
 15. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.01[A]; Miller, supra note 1, at 718; see Brian 
Casido, Benay v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc.: New Standard Needed for Determining 
Actual Use, 41 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 327, 335 (2011). 
 16. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.01[A]; Miller, supra note 1, at 718; see Brian 
Casido, Benay v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc.: New Standard Needed for Determining 
Actual Use, 41 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 327, 335 (2011). 
 17. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2010). 
 18. See Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc., 649 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2011). 
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, 
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either 
directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the 
following categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any 
accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) 
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) 
motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) 
architectural works. 
17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 19. Jackson, supra note 5, at 49. 
 20. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.03[A][1]. 
 21. See id. § 19D.02; Jackson, supra note 5, at 50; Lionel S. Sobel, The Law of Ideas, 
Revisited, 1 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 9, 21 (1994) (listing property, quasi-contract, express contract, 
implied-in-fact contract, and confidential relationship as formerly applied legal theories). 
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years contract law has emerged as the most “significant remaining 
state-law protection for literary or artistic ideas.”
22
 
Further, recent Ninth Circuit opinions have made clear that the 
1976 Copyright Act does not preempt state contract claims for the 
disclosure of ideas.
23
 Thus, in California, idea submissions
24
 are most 
often protected by contract.
25
 The legal obligation to pay for an idea 
may be found in either an express or implied-in-fact contract.
26
 The 
only difference between the two is the manner in which they are 
formed—the former is created in words, while the latter is created by 
the parties’ conduct.
27
 Most often, claimants bring idea-submission 
claims based on the implied-in-fact contract theory.
28
 
III.  DESNY CLAIMS: 
BREACH OF IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACTS 
FOR THE DISCLOSURE OF IDEAS 
The elements of a breach-of-implied-in-fact contract claim for 
idea disclosure, commonly referred to as a Desny claim,
29
 are firmly 
established in California law. In order for a plaintiff to recover, he 
must show that (1) he had an idea, (2) he disclosed his idea for sale 
to the defendant, (3) the use of the idea was clearly conditioned on 
the obligation to pay the plaintiff, (4) the defendant voluntarily 
accepted the idea disclosure, (5) the defendant actually used the idea, 
and (6) the idea had value.
30
 Although each of these elements 
 
 22. Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 629 (9th Cir. 2010); Sobel, supra 
note 21, at 21. 
 23. See, e.g., Montz, 649 F.3d at 979 (9th Cir. 2011); Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 
F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 24. “Idea Submission” is a term of art, referring to the disclosure of an idea for a television 
show, movie, or product for sale in a commercial context. Jackson, supra note 5, at 47 n.1. 
 25. See Michaud & Tulquois, supra note 9, at 75. 
 26. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.05. 
 27. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1621 (West 2011); Firchau v. Diamond Nat’l Corp., 345 F.2d 
269, 274 (9th Cir. 1965); Chandler v. Roach, 319 P.2d 776, 778–79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); Kulik, 
supra note 1, at 106; Glen L. Kulik & Craig S. Berman, Implied-in-Fact Contracts in the 
Entertainment Industry, L.A. LAW., Jan. 2006, at 10; Rubin, supra note 3, at 682; CAL. CIV. JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS § 305 (2010). 
 28. Kulik & Berman, supra note 27, at 10. 
 29. A Desny claim is the name courts frequently use when referring to a claim for breach of 
implied-in-fact contract for the disclosure of an idea. Allison S. Brehm, Creative Defense, L.A. 
LAW., Sept. 2010, at 28; see, e.g., Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 
2004); Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1956). 
 30. Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 629 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Grosso, 
383 F.3d at 967 (listing the elements of a Desny claim); Desny, 299 P.2d at 270 (same); 
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deserves in-depth discussion, this Note will focus only on the 
element of actual use, for this is the element the independent-creation 
defense addresses. 
Actual use of an idea without payment to the idea purveyor 
functions as the breach of contract in a Desny claim.
31
 It has 
consistently been the most difficult element to prove in idea-
submission cases.
32
 This is largely because the plaintiff will rarely 
have access to direct evidence of use and must therefore rely on 
circumstantial evidence.
33
 In such cases, a plaintiff may establish an 
inference of use by presenting evidence of (1) a similarity between 
his work and the infringing work and (2) the defendant’s access to 
the plaintiff’s work.
34
 This principle emanates directly from 
copyright law, and a defendant may rebut this presumption by 
presenting contradictory evidence, just as in the realm of copyright.
35
 
If two works are so similar as to reach the standard of “striking” 
similarity,
36
 then courts do not require a showing of access and 
instead infer both access and actual use from the similarity of the 
works.
37
 The inverse is not true, however. Notably, access alone 
cannot give rise to an inference of use; some degree of similarity is 
required.
38
 The degree of similarity between an allegedly stolen idea 
and an allegedly infringing work is a question of fact for the jury to 
determine.
39
 
However, there is no requisite amount of similarity and access 
that a plaintiff must demonstrate to gain an inference of actual use. 
Jurisprudence has recognized that a substantial showing of evidence 
 
Kightlinger v. White, No. B210802, 2009 WL 4022193, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2009) 
(same); Klekas v. EMI Films, Inc., 198 Cal. Rptr. 296, 304 (Ct. App. 1984) (same); Blaustein v. 
Burton, 88 Cal. Rptr. 319, 333 (Ct. App. 1970) (same); Literary and Artistic Property, supra note 
9, § 15 (same); SELZ ET AL., supra note 11, § 15:6 (same); Kulik & Berman, supra note 27, at 10 
(same). 
 31. Reginald v. New Line Cinema Corp., No. B190025, 2008 WL 588932, at *4 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Mar. 5, 2008); SELZ ET AL., supra note 11, § 15:6; Casido, supra note 15, at 336. 
 32. Casido, supra note 15, at 338. 
 33. Kulik, supra note 1, at 107. 
 34. Reginald, 2008 WL 588932, at *4; Kulik, supra note 1, at 100. 
 35. Benay, 607 F.3d at 630; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.07. 
 36. “‘Striking’ similarities . . . are similarities of the kind that cannot be explained, in the 
normal course of human events, by the possibilities of independent creation, coincidence or prior 
common source.” NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.07[C][1][d]. 
 37. Benay, 607 F.3d at 630; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.07[C][1][d]. 
 38. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.07[C][1][b]. 
 39. Kurlan v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 256 P.2d 962, 968 (Cal. 1953). 
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for one of these elements may compensate for a lack of evidence of 
the other.
40
 This principle is referred to as the “inverse ratio rule.”
41
 
It should be noted that the inverse ratio rule does not determine 
liability; its role is limited to establishing the inference of actual 
use.
42
 In both the contract and copyright context, actual use does not 
instantly give rise to liability: the works must be substantially similar 
to each other such that the amount of actual use is legally actionable, 
rather than simply factual.
43
 Stated differently, one can use another’s 
idea to a certain extent without incurring liability, but once the works 
pass the threshold of being substantially similar, the author has 
“used” another’s idea in an impermissible way. 
IV.  THE INDEPENDENT-CREATION DEFENSE 
The independent-creation defense has become one of the 
primary defenses against idea-submission claims.
44
 The defense 
allows a defendant to overcome a claim, notwithstanding that the 
plaintiff has made a showing of access and similarity, by 
affirmatively proving that the similarity is coincidental and that no 
actual use of the plaintiff’s idea has occurred because the defendant’s 
project was independently created.
45
 Courts have recognized this 
defense as a complete shield from liability.
46
 The rationale behind 
this defense is that unlawful use is not possible “when the alleged[ly] 
offending work was conceived independently of a plaintiff’s idea.”
47
 
When mounting an independent-creation defense, the defendant 
faces the burden of presenting evidence that is “clear, positive, 
uncontradicted and of such a nature that it cannot rationally be 
disbelieved.”
48
 However, this is an ambiguous standard. As one court 
 
 40. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.07[C][1][c]. 
 41. Id.; Lee S. Brenner, The Very Idea, L.A. LAW., May 2008, at 33, 37. 
 42. Sobel, supra note 21, at 70. 
 43. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.07[C][1][c]; Sobel, supra note 21, at 70–71. 
This, of course, assumes that the parties contracted for substantial similarity to trigger liability in 
the first place, given that each contract’s terms are unique. Brenner, supra note 41, at 38. 
 44. Kulik, supra note 1, at 108; see Brehm, supra note 29, at 30. 
 45. Kulik, supra note 1, at 108. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Brehm, supra note 29, at 30. 
 48. Teich v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 339 P.2d 627, 632 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959); see Hollywood 
Screentest of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 279, 292 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing 
Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 522, 534, 536 (Ct. App. 1982); NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.07[C][2]; Kulik, supra note 1, at 108. 
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stated, “whether such evidence [of independent creation] rises to the 
level of being clear, positive and uncontradicted is itself a question to 
be decided on a case-by-case basis.”
49
 California courts have 
increasingly granted summary judgment in favor of a defendant that 
meets this standard, finding there was no lawful use as a matter of 
law.
50
 This approach severely increases the burden placed on the 
plaintiff to establish his prima facie case.
51
 
This is so because the application of the independent-creation 
defense at the summary judgment stage of litigation is wholly 
misplaced. There are multiple factual inquiries that would require a 
jury’s determination before such a defense would even become 
relevant.
52
 This defense does not become relevant or necessary until 
after the court analyzes the plaintiff’s prima facie case.
53
 Within this 
primary analysis, the court must find the existence of the implied-in-
fact contract, its terms, and a breach resulting from uncompensated 
use of the plaintiff’s idea. If the factual findings show that the 
plaintiff did, in fact, have a valid contract and that it was breached, 
this would create an issue as to the actual use of the plaintiff’s idea—
a factual question for the jury—rendering summary judgment 
inappropriate.
54
 If one were to ignore this necessary analysis and 
award summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the court would 
essentially be holding that a defendant could exculpate himself by 
simply telling an alternative story of creation for his work while 
 
 49. Kulik, supra note 1, at 108 (citing Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 54 Cal. 
Rptr. 130, 133 (Ct. App. 1966)). 
 50. Brehm, supra note 29, at 30. 
 51. Id. at 32. 
 52. First, the very existence of the contract is a factual inquiry, wherein a jury must decide 
whether the plaintiff presented circumstances that qualify as those that form the implied-in-fact 
contract. See Scott v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 904 P.2d 834, 839 (Cal. 1995); Desny v. Wilder, 299 
P.2d 257, 273–74 (Cal. 1956). Second, identifying the terms of the contract is also a factual 
inquiry, wherein the jury must decide what degree of use the parties contracted for and whether 
the contract required novelty. Kashmiri v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 635, 650 (Ct. 
App. 2007); see Stanley v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 221 P.2d 73, 86 (Cal. 1950) (Traynor, J., 
dissenting) (“If the idea is not novel, the evidence must establish that the promisor agreed 
expressly or impliedly to pay for the idea whether or not it was novel.”). Third, determining when 
and if a breach of the contract occurred is also a fact-based inquiry best left to a jury. See Kurlan 
v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 256 P.2d 962, 968 (Cal. 1953). 
 53. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 54. See infra Part IV.B.2, IV.B.4. 
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under oath.
55
 Thus, this defense is neither as logically sound nor as 
legally strong as it may appear to be at first blush. 
A.  The Development of the 
Independent-Creation Defense 
The seminal case in the development of the independent-
creation defense was Teich v. General Mills.
56
 There, Jules Teich 
filed suit for breach of an implied-in-fact contract when the 
defendant allegedly stole his idea for a premium—a toy camera—in 
a cereal box.
57
 The plaintiff’s idea was not novel—it was a kit for 
making “sun pictures,” which was a common activity for children at 
that time.
58
 The plaintiff contacted the defendant, General Mills, at 
its Los Angeles Office seeking to sell his idea, which then directed 
him to Otis Young of the San Francisco based Sperry Operations, a 
division of General Mills.
59
 The plaintiff commenced communication 
with Young on July 6, 1955, via written correspondence, following 
up with a telephone call.
60
 Eventually, the plaintiff visited Young’s 
office, where he “clearly conditioned” his disclosure of his idea on 
receiving payment, and subsequently disclosed the idea to Young 
and two other employees of General Mills who were present in the 
meeting.
61
 At General Mills’s request, the plaintiff left some samples 
at the office.
62
 From that day forward, however, Young completely 
ignored the plaintiff.
63
 In January of 1956, the plaintiff saw a 
package of the General Mills cereal “Trix” containing a “Magic Sun 
Picture” premium inside and filed suit.
64
 
General Mills’s story for the creation of its “Magic Sun Picture” 
toy differed dramatically from the plaintiff’s narrative.
65
 General 
Mills claimed that Herbert Valentine and Earl Radford of Valentine-
 
 55. Barsha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 90 P.2d 371, 374 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939); NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.07[C][2]. 
 56. 339 P.2d 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). 
 57. Id. at 629. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. Young was responsible for procuring premiums (toys) for Sperry products and 
claimed he had no duty to report his activities to General Mills’ headquarters in Minneapolis. Id. 
 60. Id. at 630. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 632–33. 
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Radford, a Kansas City advertising agency, had developed the toy 
and had first written to James Street at General Mills’s Minneapolis 
office with the idea on May 27, 1955.
66
 Thereafter, they 
corresponded via mail, culminating with an offer to option 
Valentine’s “Sun Pix” premium in a letter dated August 19, 1955.
67
 
On January 16, 1956, General Mills purchased 6,250,000 “Sun Pix” 
from Valentine.
68
 
General Mills supported its story with the letters that it had 
exchanged with Valentine, along with uncontradicted testimony from 
Lowry Crites, the advertising manager for General Mills in the 
Minneapolis office; James Street, the premium manager for General 
Mills out of the Minneapolis office throughout 1955; and Herbert 
Valentine, one of the independent creators of the toy who sold the 
idea to General Mills.
69
 Additionally, the defendant offered six 
letters that Valentine had written to other independent companies 
during his development of his “Sun Pix” premium.
70
 It was clear that 
the defendant firmly established a history for Valentine’s idea. 
The jury awarded the plaintiff $35,000, but the judge granted the 
defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
71
 
which the plaintiff appealed.
72
 The appellate court began its analysis 
by stating that proof “of access and similarity raises an inference of 
copying.”
73
 It went on to state explicitly that “[t]he weight to be 
given the inference [of copying] as against direct evidence of 
nonaccess and noncopying is a question for the trier of fact,” and that 
 
 66. Id. at 632. 
 67. Id. at 633. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 632–33. 
 70. Id. at 633–34. The first letter, dated June 1, 1955, was sent from Valentine to Walt 
Disney Enterprises, inquiring about the use of Disney characters on their packaging; the second, 
also dated June 1, 1955, was sent from Valentine to Holiday Plastics, Inc., inquiring about acetate 
pricing; the third, dated June 9, 1955, was sent from Eastman Kodak Company to Valentine, 
regarding a question Valentine had posed about packaging proof paper with a negative; the fourth 
letter, dated June 13, 1955, advised Valentine that the trademark “Sun Pix” was available for use; 
the fifth letter, dated June 22, 1955, was sent from Valentine to Highland Supply Company, 
inquiring about printing on acetate photos; and the sixth letter, dated July 7, 1955, was sent from 
Milprint, Inc. to Valentine, responding to a request for printing quotes on packaging materials. Id. 
 71. A judgment notwithstanding the verdict is “[a] judgment entered for one party even 
though a jury verdict has been rendered for the opposing party.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
919–20 (9th ed. 2009). 
 72. Teich, 339 P.2d at 629. 
 73. Id. at 631. 
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“[t]he implied finding of the jury of similarity is binding upon a 
reviewing court if supported by substantial evidence.”
74
 The court 
held that any differences between the plaintiff’s toy and the Trix 
premium were insignificant,
75
 and neither side disputed the issue of 
access.
76
 Therefore, the plaintiff had gained the inference of unlawful 
use and had proven the breach of his implied-in-fact contract.
77
 
However, the court did not stop its analysis there. It then 
reasoned that the jury could not reject the defendant’s uncontradicted 
testimony of independent creation.
78
 Upholding the lower court’s 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court held that while the 
trier of fact was empowered to reject the testimony of a witness, even 
though uncontradicted, there was an exception that prevented the 
jury from “running away with the case.”
79
 The court explained that 
the jury could not “indulge in [an] inference when that inference 
[was] rebutted by clear, positive and uncontradicted evidence of such 
a nature that it is not subject to doubt in the minds of reasonable 
men,” and that “[t]he trier of the facts [could] not believe 
impossibilities.”
80
 
The court then directly recognized the independent-creation 
defense, asking whether “proof that there was no copying of [the] 
plaintiff’s product [created] a complete defense, although the thing 
actually used by [the] defendant was closely similar to the one which 
[the] plaintiff had presented to it.”
81
 Based on the weight of 
authority, the court held that the answer must be yes.
82
 The court 
closed with a quote from Barsha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer,
83
 stating 
that the jury “would have been more than stupid if [it] believed that 
[it] could return a verdict for plaintiffs without a finding on [its] part 
that appellants had used plaintiffs’ composition . . . .”
84
 
 
 74. Id. (quoting Kovacs v. Mut. Broad. Sys., 221 P.2d 108, 114 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950)). 
 75. Id. at 633. 
 76. See id. at 631–32. 
 77. See id. at 633. 
 78. Id. at 632. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 633. 
 81. Id. at 634. 
 82. Id. 
 83. 90 P.2d 371 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939). 
 84. Teich, 339 P.2d at 635 (quoting Barsha, 90 P.2d at 376). 
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On the surface, the Teich court’s reasoning seemed just, since it 
concluded that the defendant did not use the plaintiff’s idea and, 
therefore, owed him no payment.
85
 However, the court relied on a 
lofty assumption in concluding as it did—that the defendant could 
not have used both parties’ ideas.
86
 The court completely disregarded 
the possibility that the defendant owed compensation to both the 
plaintiff and the third-party creator, Valentine.
87
 Both parties 
presented credible, well-supported stories of the creation of their 
ideas and evidence sufficient to establish the formation of contracts 
with General Mills.
88
 The court explicitly stated that the plaintiff had 
successfully entered into an implied-in-fact contract with General 
Mills, yet it then denied him his deserved contractual recovery when 
the defendant presented a second source for the same idea.
89
 
If a party is able to avoid its contractual obligation to pay 
someone for a service by simply contracting with a third party for 
that same service, how does that enable a person to rely on his 
contract? It doesn’t. The Teich opinion runs counter to the strong 
policy in favor of freedom of contract, which is aimed at encouraging 
parties to engage in business more efficiently and to stimulate the 
economy.
90
 Consider the following hypothetical: Dan is looking for 
the best seeds to plant on his farm. Alan, a seed vendor anxious to 
make a sale, promises to give Dan one hundred seeds in exchange for 
Dan’s promise to pay him $9 for the seeds if Dan plants them. Bob, 
another a seed vendor anxious to make a sale, promises to give Dan 
one hundred of the same seeds in exchange for Dan’s promise to pay 
him $10 for his seeds if Dan plants them. Two contracts have been 
formed—the Dan-Alan contract and the Dan-Bob contract. Both 
Alan and Bob give Dan their seeds, and Dan mixes all of the seeds 
together in the same bucket. He then plants half of them and cannot 
possibly determine whose seeds were planted. Dan then pays only 
Alan and refuses to pay Bob for his seeds. The Teich opinion would 
 
 85. See id. at 634. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See supra text accompanying notes 56–70. 
 89. Teich, 339 P.2d at 630, 636. 
 90. See 1 B.E. WITKIN ET AL., SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 323, at 351 (10th ed. 
2005) (“[B]argaining and equality of bargaining . . . are the theoretical parents of the American 
law of contracts.”). 
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condone Dan’s actions because it stands for the proposition that Dan 
could not possibly have contracted with two people for the same 
seeds. This is both logically unsound and unjust, and Dan must fulfill 
his contractual obligation to both parties or pay damages for 
breaching the agreement between them. Simply proving the 
existence of a duplicative contractual agreement does not negate the 
validity of another; therefore, the independent-creation defense has 
been misplaced in contract law since its very inception. 
B.  The Misapplication of the 
Independent-Creation Defense 
In addition to the policy and logic problems courts have created 
by permitting such a defense to be used in the contract context, 
courts have consistently misanalyzed idea-submission claims in its 
wake. What follows is a detailed discussion of four cases on which 
courts and scholars have relied to more firmly establish the 
independent-creation defense. When closely scrutinized, however, it 
becomes apparent that these cases actually misapply the law of ideas 
and exacerbate the confusion surrounding contract rights in the 
context of idea submission. 
1.  Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc. 
First, in Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc.,
91
 Bernice Mann filed 
suit for breach of an implied-in-fact contract, alleging that Columbia 
Pictures stole her idea for a film titled “Women Plus” and used it in 
its film Shampoo.
92
 Mann submitted her twenty-nine-page outline of 
“Women Plus” in a sealed envelope to Caplan, an employee at 
Columbia, through a mutual friend.
93
 The plaintiff never had any 
direct contact with the Columbia employee, however.
94
 Further, 
Caplan never delivered the outline to Columbia, but instead 
submitted it to his own company, Filmmakers.
95
 Filmmakers sent 
Mann a rejection letter for another manuscript but notably never 
 
 91. Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 522 (Ct. App. 1982). 
 92. Id. at 524. 
 93. Id. at 527. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 528. 
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returned “Women Plus” and had no record of ever having received 
it.
96
 
Columbia mounted an independent-creation defense, asserting 
that two independent writers, Beatty and Towne, had written 
Shampoo in 1974 and submitted it to Columbia.
97
 It supported this 
assertion with extensive evidence at trial showing that Towne created 
the 161-page Shampoo screenplay in 1970 and had been working on 
it since 1965.
98
 In order to support its nonreceipt of Mann’s 
screenplay, Columbia juxtaposed the fact that its submission records 
contained submission cards, author cards, title cards, and synopses 
for Shampoo with the fact that it had no such cards for “Women 
Plus.”
99
 
At trial, the jury awarded Mann $185,000, but the defendants 
successfully moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
100
 
Upholding this ruling, the appellate court initially stated that any 
similarities that Mann presented between her work and Shampoo 
were without legal significance because “the trial record show[ed] 
only that Towne and Beatty independently wrote the ‘Shampoo’ 
screenplay and script changes.”
101
 Further, it stated that although it 
was possible that the jury inferred access and use from the 
similarities between “Women Plus” and Shampoo, such an inference 
“was rebutted by clear, positive and uncontradicted evidence.”
102
 
Completing its analysis, the appellate court held that because 
Caplan never delivered the plaintiff’s outline to Columbia—as no 
evidence supported such an allegation—the plaintiff failed to 
establish access to her work.
103
 The court bluntly explained in its 
holding that “[s]ince there was neither a submission of ‘Women 
Plus’ to Columbia, nor any contact between the screenplay authors 
and the people alleged to have possessed [the] plaintiff’s treatment, 
there is no substantial evidence to support the jury verdict.”
104
 The 
 
 96. Id. In addition to the rejection letter, he also returned a second script that Mann had 
submitted along with “Women Plus” to Mann. Id. 
 97. Id. at 531. 
 98. Id. at 532. 
 99. Id. at 531–32. 
 100. Id. at 524. 
 101. Id. at 527. 
 102. Id. at 534. 
 103. Id. at 530, 532. 
 104. Id. at 535. 
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plaintiff could not establish access based on “mere possibilities” of 
submission.
105
 Additionally, the plaintiff had not established that the 
independent creators, Beatty and Towne, had access to the plaintiff’s 
work; therefore, the court concluded that a jury could not infer that 
they used the plaintiff’s idea.
106
 Finally, the court refused to permit 
an inference of both access and use based on the amount of similarity 
that Mann had presented.
107
 
The issue with the Mann opinion is that the court engaged in an 
inverted analysis, which has caused the case to appear to stand for 
much more than it actually does. Both Courts and commentators 
have interpreted Mann as showing that evidence of independent 
creation defeats a valid implied-in-fact contract claim.
108
 This 
interpretation is erroneous, however, for all that the opinion truly 
stands for is that when there is no showing of access, a plaintiff 
cannot gain an inference of actual use.
109
 Therefore, there has been 
no contractual breach, and the plaintiff cannot recover.
110
 All of the 
analysis pertaining to the independent-creation defense in Mann is 
irrelevant and would be more properly treated as dicta given the 
plaintiff’s failure to establish an element of her prima facie case—
actual use.
111
 Because the court engaged in the independent-creation 
defense analysis before addressing the validity of the plaintiff’s 
initial claim, it performed an analysis that was unnecessary and has 
since misled litigants, commentators, and judges who rely on this 
case as law.
112
 
 
 105. Id. at 536. 
 106. Id. at 527. 
 107. Id. at 532 (“The access of Towne and Beatty to ‘Women Plus’ may only be inferred from 
the similarities between plaintiff's treatment and the motion picture ‘Shampoo.’ Apart from these 
similarities, Mann’s evidence is insufficient to infer defendants’ access to ‘Women Plus,’ as 
plaintiff offers only speculation and the mere possibility that Caplan or Crutcher submitted the 
missing treatment to Columbia’s story department.”). 
 108. Brehm, supra note 29, at 31. 
 109. See Mann, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 535–36. 
 110. See id. 
 111. See id. at 532. 
 112. See, e.g., Kightlinger v. White, No. B210802, 2009 WL 4022193 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 
2009); Hollywood Screentest of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 279 (Ct. App. 
2007); Brehm, supra note 29, at 31–32. 
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2.  Hollywood Screentest of America v. NBC Universal, Inc. 
A subsequent case in which a court misapplied the independent-
creation defense was Hollywood Screentest of America v. NBC 
Universal, Inc.
113
 There, James Pascucci, who had contacted Jeff 
Zucker at NBC to pitch his idea for a show called “Hollywood 
Screentest,” filed a breach-of-contract suit, claiming that NBC, in 
conjunction with Silver Pictures, had unlawfully used his ideas in its 
new show Next Action Star.
114
 Before disclosing his ideas, the 
plaintiff obtained a signed confidentiality agreement from Zucker 
stating that the plaintiff owned every idea he was going to disclose 
except for those that were “generally available to the public.”
115
 
After the plaintiff pitched a series of show ideas and marketing 
concepts to NBC and spoke with various executives over the course 
of several months, NBC ultimately rejected the plaintiff’s idea.
116
 
NBC subsequently issued a press release for its new show, Next 
Action Star, at which point the plaintiff filed suit, believing NBC had 
stolen his idea.
117
 
In its defense, NBC presented evidence that Next Action Star 
had been independently created.
118
 This evidence established that 
three different companies had together created Next Action Star over 
the course of a year before they ever pitched it to NBC.
119
 The court 
noted that the plaintiff provided no evidence to contradict the 
testimony of the employees of the three companies who allegedly 
created the show independently.
120
 
The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment, and the plaintiff appealed.
121
 The appellate court began its 
analysis by focusing on NBC’s independent-creation defense.
122
 It 
explained that it had “found that NBC ha[d] successfully shown 
undisputed evidence of independent creation by entities unrelated to 
 
 113. 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 279 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 114. Id. at 281–83. 
 115. Id. at 281–82. 
 116. Id. at 282–83. 
 117. Id. at 283. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 284. 
 121. Id. at 281. 
 122. Id. at 290–91. 
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NBC and unassisted by NBC.”
123
 The court then “look[ed] carefully 
at [the] appellants’ evidence to determine whether they ha[d] 
provided any evidence that call[ed] into question the evidence 
supporting independent creation” and found that “they ha[d] not.”
124
 
The court then briefly addressed the actual-use element of the 
plaintiff’s claim, stating that the “[a]ppellants point[ed] to no 
evidence that NBC actually used their ideas” but that they “ask[ed] 
that [the court] draw inferences based on general similarities and 
timing.”
125
 Such speculation was not sufficient to create a disputed 
issue of fact.
126
 
Upholding the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the 
court held that because NBC had presented undisputed evidence of 
independent creation, the plaintiff’s causes of action could not 
survive.
127
 Significantly, the court went one step further, stating that 
the “[a]ppellants’ cause of action for an implied-in-fact contract for 
payment in exchange for the use of ideas necessarily require[d] a 
finding that NBC actually used [the] appellants’ ideas.”
128
 However, 
“that element [wa]s negated by the uncontradicted evidence of the 
independent creation of Next Action Star.”
129
 Accordingly, “the 
cause of action for breach of implied-in-fact contract . . . fail[ed] as a 
matter of law.”
130
 
In Hollywood Screentest, the court erred twice in its analysis, 
further confusing the validity and efficacy of the independent- 
creation defense. First, like in Mann, the court focused its initial 
inquiry on the independent-creation defense, rather than focusing on 
the strength of the plaintiff’s underlying claim.
131
 As the court held 
later in the opinion, the plaintiff had failed to ever establish actual 
use of his idea.
132
 This means that he never had a valid claim, and the 
issue of independent creation was superfluous. Second, the court 
omitted any real analysis of substantial similarity, presumably 
 
 123. Id. at 291. 
 124. Id. at 291–92. 
 125. Id. at 292. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 293. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. at 290–91. 
 132. See id. at 292. 
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because the evidence of similarity was so weak that the court did not 
find it worth examining. 
The problem with this approach is that the court needlessly 
focused all of its attention on the defendant’s independent-creation 
defense. Moreover, the court overstated its holding when it wrote 
that “[use] is negated by the uncontradicted evidence of the 
independent creation of Next Action Star.”
133
 This case should not be 
interpreted to stand for this proposition. Rather, it should be read to 
mean that, in the absence of an inference of actual use, there can be 
no recovery under an implied-in-fact contract since the plaintiff 
cannot prove any breach. The issue of independent creation is, 
therefore, irrelevant in this context. The plaintiff’s claim failed as a 
matter of law for only one true reason—he failed to state a prima 
facie case.
134
 Had the plaintiff successfully established an inference 
of use, he would have created a disputed issue of fact as to that 
element and survived summary judgment.
135
 
Unfortunately, there is additional language in this opinion that is 
potentially subject to inaccurate interpretation. Specifically, the court 
stated that “[b]ecause NBC ha[d] presented undisputed evidence of 
independent creation, thus preventing a finding of use, none of [the] 
appellants’ causes of action [could] survive.”
136
 This statement is 
precariously open to misinterpretation. This language should stand 
only for the proposition that, in the absence of an inference of actual 
use, a defendant’s evidence of independent creation is undisputed. 
Unfortunately, this language, taken at face value, seems to require 
plaintiffs to create issues of disputed facts in the underlying facts of 
the defendant’s independent-creation defense, which is an unfair 
burden. Such language suggests that a court should require the 
plaintiff not only to prove his claim but also to disprove the 
defendant’s independent-creation theory, which is not an element of 
an implied-in-fact contract claim.
137
 Stated differently, if a plaintiff 
makes a prima facie showing of his claim, the burden should shift to 
the defendant to prove its affirmative defense. If the defendant fails 
 
 133. See id. at 293. 
 134. See id. at 292. 
 135. See id. 
 136. Id. (emphasis added). 
 137. See supra text accompanying note 30. 
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to do so, then it loses. A plaintiff should not be required to disprove 
the affirmative defense of independent creation, as this places the 
burden on the wrong party. Thus, it should not function as a bar to a 
plaintiff reaching a jury. 
3.  Kightlinger v. White 
A California court recently applied the erroneous reasoning from 
Hollywood Screentest in an unpublished opinion when it upheld 
summary judgment for the defendant in Kightlinger v. White.
138
 
There, Laura Kightlinger filed suit for breach of an implied-in-fact 
contract against Mike White for using the ideas contained in her 
screenplay, “We’re All Animals,” in his own screenplay, “The Year 
of the Dog.”
139
 In late 2002 or early 2003, Kightlinger gave White a 
copy of her screenplay, which he admitted to having read.
140
 In late 
2005, White wrote a similar screenplay.
141
 The defendant asserted 
that he had not copied the plaintiff’s work but had instead used his 
own life experiences as source material for his work.
142
 
In analyzing the claim, the court first stated that the plaintiff 
could establish an interference of use by showing that the defendant 
had access to the idea and copied it.
143
 The court then stated that if 
the plaintiff could show substantial similarity between the works, she 
could establish an inference of use.
144
 The court did not analyze 
access, because the defendant admitted to having read and retained 
the plaintiff’s work.
145
 The court then explained that, when 
examining the similarity prong, “[t]here is no bright line test for 
determining whether two works are substantially similar.”
146
 The 
court stated that its role was to assess whether a reasonable juror 
could find the works substantially similar, and it concluded that a 
 
 138. Kightlinger v. White, No. B210802, 2009 WL 4022193, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 
2009). Although the opinion is unpublished and therefore is not binding, it is indicative of the 
issues materializing in the wake of Hollywood Screentest. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at *10. 
 143. Id. at *3, *9. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
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reasonable juror could not.
147
 After determining that there was no 
substantial similarity between the works,
148
 the court took one final 
step, holding that the defendant had demonstrated through 
“uncontradicted evidence” that he independently created his work.
149
 
Quoting Hollywood Screentest, the court held that the “defendant’s 
evidence of independent creation [was] ‘clear, positive, 
uncontradicted and of such a nature that it [could not] rationally be 
disbelieved’ and, therefore, rebut[ted] an inference of use.”
150
 
The court in Kightlinger erred in two respects in its analysis.
151
 
First, it misstated the law when defining how one established an 
inference of actual use.
152
 But more importantly, the court indulged 
in an unnecessary review of the independent-creation defense and 
misapplied it while doing so. Having concluded that there was no 
substantial similarity between the two works—albeit through a 
flawed analysis—the court refused to grant the plaintiff an inference 
of actual use. Therefore, she failed to establish her prima facie case, 
and the court should have upheld summary judgment for the 
defendant on those grounds alone. 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at *6. 
 149. Id. at *9. 
 150. Id. at *10 (quoting Teich v. Gen. Mills, 339 P.2d 627,632 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959)). 
 151. It should be noted that the court also erred in a third way. The court, commenting on the 
scènes à faire that were common to both works, stated that the “defendant most likely gathered 
such ideas from the public domain . . . [and] conclude[d] [that] such scenes and references [could 
not] and [did] not form a basis for finding substantial similarity.” Id. at *6. This conclusion that 
non-novel scene-a-faires could not be used when comparing the two works’ similarities was 
inaccurate. There is no requirement in California contract law that the ideas for which one seeks 
recovery be novel; therefore, the court erroneously excluded them as evidence of substantial 
similarity. See Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 629 (9th Cir. 2010); Blaustein 
v. Burton, 88 Cal. Rptr. 319, 334 (Ct. App. 1970) (“An idea which can be the subject matter of a 
contract need not be novel or concrete.”); Minniear v. Tors, 72 Cal. Rptr. 287, 293 (Ct. App. 
1968); Chandler v. Roach, 319 P.2d 776, 781–82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) (“We see no necessity to 
add the elements of novelty and concreteness to implied-in-fact contracts with reference to 
authors. Their status should be identically the same as that of any other person in any other 
implied-in-fact contract situation.”); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.06[B][2][b] 
(“However, in 1957, the California Court of Appeal held that novelty is not a necessary element 
in implied-in-fact contract cases.”). 
 152. See Kightlinger, 2009 WL 4022193, at *3. The court improperly asserted that a showing 
of substantial similarity would establish both access and copying. See id. Rather, it is similarity 
and access that together establish an inference of use. Reginald v. New Line Cinema Corp., No. 
B190025, 2008 WL 588932, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2008); Kulik, supra note 1, at 100. 
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However, the court also went on to state that the defendant’s 
evidence of independent creation was “uncontradicted.”
153
 If the 
court based its conclusion on a finding that there was no inference of 
actual use, then such a statement would have been appropriate.
154
 
Instead, this holding was based on the proposition that the plaintiff 
had not disputed any of the defendant’s underlying facts for his 
defense.
155
 In this regard, not only did the court assign an improper 
burden to the plaintiff, but the facts of the case did not support the 
conclusion itself. First, in all past instances where the independent-
creation defense had been successful, the defendant had shown that 
he acquired the offending work from an independent third party.
156
 
Here, the defendant allegedly created the screenplay himself.
157
 
Therefore, as a matter of legal theory, the independent-creation 
defense was entirely misplaced.
158
 Further, the plaintiff’s evidence 
showed that the defendant had access to her work.
159
 All prior 
assertions of successful independent-creation defenses succeeded 
precisely because the independent creator proved that he had no 
access to the plaintiff’s work.
160
 Thus, because of this misguided 
application of the defense, this case displays how reliance on 
Hollywood Screentest will further occlude the true meaning and 
effect of the independent-creation defense. 
4.  Scottish American Media v. NBC Universal 
A final example of the misapplication of the independent-
creation defense occurred in Scottish American Media v. NBC 
 
 153. Kightlinger, 2009 WL 4022193, at *10. 
 154. See id. (“Defendant’s evidence demonstrates that, in significant and material respects, 
YOTD is based on events in his life and not on ideas in plaintiff’s screenplay.”). 
 155. See id. at *9 (“We hold that, under the particular facts of this case, defendant 
demonstrated through uncontradicted evidence that he wrote and created [“The Year of the Dog”] 
independent[ly].”). 
 156. See, e.g., Hollywood Screentest of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
279 (Ct. App. 2007); Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 522 (Ct. App. 1982); Teich 
v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 339 P.2d 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). 
 157. Kightlinger, 2009 WL 4022193, at *9. 
 158. See, e.g., Hollywood Screentest of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
279 (Ct. App. 2007); Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 522 (Ct. App. 1982); Teich 
v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 339 P.2d 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). 
 159. See Kightlinger, 2009 WL 4022193, at *1. 
 160. See supra Part IV. 
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Universal.
161
 There, Maurice Fraser, who had no prior experience in 
the entertainment industry,
162
 wrote a treatment for a song 
competition titled “Battle of the States.”
163
 In June 2004, the plaintiff 
pitched his idea to a man named Plestis via telephone, but was 
unsuccessful.
164
 The plaintiff then contacted Silverman,
165
 who met 
with the plaintiff.
166
 In this meeting, the plaintiff pitched his idea, 
and Silverman pointed out that his idea was just like Eurovision, a 
European television song competition.
167
 Silverman subsequently 
rejected the plaintiff’s idea via e-mail, at which point the plaintiff 
went to NBC in person and allegedly gave a copy of his treatment to 
a new trainee, who allegedly promised to give it to Plestis.
168
 Later, 
NBC and Reveille began developing a show called “American 
Anthem,” prompting the plaintiff to file suit, believing it to be an 
unlawful use of his idea.
169
 
Not surprisingly, the defendants mounted an independent-
creation defense in their motion for summary judgment.
170
 They 
claimed that Silverman had come up with the idea to create an 
American version of Eurovision in 2005, which he pitched to NBC 
executive Jeff Zucker in June of that year.
171
 In order to avoid rights 
issues, however, Silverman wanted to use the plaintiff’s treatment in 
place of Eurovision.
172
 Silverman e-mailed NBC urging them to use 
the plaintiff’s idea, but NBC responded that it preferred Eurovision, 
at which point Silverman dropped the plaintiff’s concept.
173
 
Silverman’s company then acquired the rights to Eurovision and 
 
 161. Scottish Am. Media, LLC v. NBC Universal, Inc., No. B205344, 2009 WL 1124942 
(Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2009). Although unpublished, this case demonstrates the improper 
development of the independent-creation defense in California courts. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at *2. 
 164. Id. at *3. 
 165. Ben Silverman also does business as “Ben Silverman Productions LLC doing business as 
Reveille 1 and Reveille 2,” and is a television producer for domestic and foreign markets. Id. at 
*1. 
 166. Id. at *3. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. Neither the trainee nor Plestis had any recollection of the plaintiff’s treatment. Id. 
 169. Id. at *5. 
 170. Id. at *6. 
 171. Id. at *4. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
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began working with NBC on the show.
174
 Ultimately, NBC decided 
not to move forward with the project, and the show was never 
produced, despite Silverman’s attempt to pitch it to other 
networks.
175
 
The court relied on Hollywood Screentest as guiding 
precedent.
176
 It began its opinion by acknowledging the independent-
creation defense, stating that because NBC obtained the rights to 
Eurovision and put together a team, which developed the idea 
without using the plaintiff’s work, the defendants did not use the 
plaintiff’s treatment.
177
 The court then stated the following rule: 
“Where [a] plaintiff conveys an idea to [a] defendant, and [the] 
defendant produces a product similar to [the] plaintiff’s idea, an 
inference arises that [the] defendant used [the] plaintiff’s idea. The 
inference may be dispelled by evidence of independent creation of 
defendant’s product.”
178
 The court then pointed out that the 
plaintiff’s argument of unlawful use was based on similarities 
between the two programs instead of on “evidence controverting 
[the] defendants’ evidence of independent creation.”
179
 The court 
further inferred that the plaintiff had developed his idea based on 
Eurovision, and the court relied on copyright principles, holding that 
“protection [did] not extend to . . . material traceable to common 
sources.”
180
 In summation, the court relied on Hollywood Screentest, 
holding: 
[The] plaintiffs presented evidence of similarity sufficient 
to raise an inference that [the] defendants used [the 
plaintiff’s] idea. [The d]efendants dispelled the inference by 
presenting evidence of independent creation of [the] 
defendant’s show. [The p]laintiffs failed to provide any 
evidence that call[ed] into question the evidence supporting 
independent creation. The trial court therefore properly 
 
 174. Id. at *5. 
 175. Id. at *6. 
 176. Id. at *8. 
 177. Id. at *10. 
 178. Id. at *8 (citations omitted) (citing Hollywood Screentest of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, 
Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 279, 290–91 (Ct. App. 2007)). 
 179. Id. at *10. 
 180. Id. (quoting Chase-Ribound v. Dreamworks, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 1222, 1226 (C.D. Cal. 
1997)). 
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adjudicated summarily [the] plaintiffs’ cause of action for 
breach of implied contract.
181
 
The court, relying on the overbroad language from the 
Hollywood Screentest decision, misapplied both the law of ideas and 
the independent-creation defense. First, the court mistakenly began 
by analyzing the affirmative defense rather than the plaintiff’s prima 
facie case.
182
 Had the court done its analysis properly, it would have 
performed the requisite analysis of both substantial similarity and 
access, which are absent from the opinion.
183
 Second, the court 
imposed the concept of novelty, necessary in copyright, but 
unnecessary in an implied-in-fact contract, to hold that any 
similarities between the works were not due to the defendant’s use of 
the plaintiff’s work but were instead due to both parties having used 
common source material.
184
 
Third, the court criticized the plaintiff’s evidentiary offering as 
inadequate because he had done nothing to dispute the underlying 
facts of the defendants’ affirmative defense, and it awarded summary 
judgment for the defendant.
185
 Such reasoning was erroneous 
because the court imposed a burden on the plaintiff not only to prove 
his prima facie case but also to disprove the defendants’ affirmative 
defense before ever reaching a jury.
186
 The potential 
misinterpretation of the Hollywood Screentest holding described 
above was realized in this opinion, for the court imposed on the 
plaintiff the additional burden of disproving independent creation in 
order to survive summary judgment.
187
 Here, actual use was a 
disputed issue of fact. The plaintiff had presented evidence sufficient 
to establish an inference of actual use,
188
 which when met with the 
defendants’ independent-creation defense, created a disputed issue 
that should have gone to the jury for resolution. Instead, the court 
ignored this conflict and ruled that the plaintiff needed to provide 
 
 181. Id. at *11 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (citing Hollywood Screentest, 60 
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 290–92). 
 182. See id. at *10. 
 183. See supra text accompanying notes 31–43. 
 184. See Scottish Am. Media, 2009 WL 1124942, at *10. 
 185. Id. at *11. 
 186. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 187. See Scottish Am. Media, 2009 WL 1124942, at *11. 
 188. Id. at *10. 
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evidence that called into question the defendants’ affirmative defense 
in order to survive summary judgment.
189
 
5.  The Current Effect of the 
Independent-Creation Defense 
The above examples illustrate that California courts have 
misapplied the independent-creation defense. Through their 
unstructured analyses and overbroad language, courts have 
seemingly stretched the defense far beyond its appropriate use. 
Additionally, the very logic underlying the defense is inapposite to 
basic principles of contract law.
190
 The Teich court, in recognizing 
the independent-creation defense, sought to relieve idea recipients of 
liability upon a showing that they did not actually use a plaintiff’s 
idea.
191
 The effect of the defense, however, has been to 
impermissibly allow defendants to escape valid contractual 
obligations.
192
 As explained above, the existence of two contractual 
obligations for the same service does not render one of those 
contracts invalid by default. 
Although the unsuitability of the independent-creation defense 
highlights the problem, the defense itself is only part of a larger 
problem—the inadministrable body of California idea law. As it 
stands, California law not only potentially denies relief to deserving 
idea purveyors, but it also stands to wrongfully punish innocent idea 
recipients. This is so for one reason: when protection is afforded to 
ideas that arguably have no distinguishable characteristics,
193
 there is 
no clear method for determining if actual use of an idea has occurred. 
This does not mean that purveyors of nonnovel and nonconcrete 
 
 189. Id. at *11. 
 190. See SELZ ET AL., supra note 11, § 15:6. 
 191. See Teich v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 339 P.2d 627, 634–35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). 
 192. See supra Part IV. 
 193. See Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 629 (9th Cir. 2010); Blaustein v. 
Burton, 88 Cal. Rptr. 319, 334 (Ct. App. 1970) (“An idea which can be the subject matter of a 
contract need not be novel or concrete.”); Minniear v. Tors, 72 Cal. Rptr. 287, 293 (Ct. App. 
1968); Chandler v. Roach, 319 P.2d 776, 781–82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (“We see no necessity to 
add the elements of novelty and concreteness to implied-in-fact contracts with reference to 
authors. Their status should be identically the same as that of any other person in any other 
implied-in-fact contract situation.”); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.06[B][2][b] 
(“However, in 1957, the California Court of Appeal held that novelty is not a necessary element 
in implied-in-fact contract cases.”). An idea that is neither novel nor concrete is arguably 
indistinct from other similar ideas. 
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ideas are not worthy of legal protection for their service of 
disclosure, but rather that affording them such protection raises a 
serious issue of administrability. 
If proponents of the independent-creation defense wish for it to 
be reliable, then the law must provide a jury with the tools necessary 
to distinguish whether a work’s source was one distinct idea or 
another.
194
 However, in California, where courts afford ideas 
protection regardless of novelty and concreteness,
195
 there is no 
guarantee that an idea will be uniquely identifiable within a 
potentially infringing work. Stated differently, two seemingly 
identical ideas from two different purveyors are currently presented 
to a jury (1) as a plaintiff’s story of the creation and submission of 
her idea—the implied-in-fact contract claim—and (2) as the 
defendant’s equally compelling story of the creation of the work 
from another idea—the independent-creation defense.
196
 The two 
ideas—or single idea with two sources—likely appear 
interchangeable in the eyes of a jury, rendering the independent-
creation defense useless to negate the element of actual use and 
leading to both juror confusion and unpredictable verdicts. 
V.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
All hope is not lost, however. Two possible solutions can 
resolve the conflicts between the independent-creation defense and 
contract policies
197
 and can mitigate the uncertainty and 
inadministrability created by the current inconsistencies in the law of 
ideas. The first solution proposes a reform of the analysis that courts 
currently (ideally) apply to Desny claims. The second solution leaves 
the current body of law intact but instead suggests alterations to the 
effect of the independent-creation defense and the remedies to which 
one is entitled. While both proposals offer relief, ultimately this Note 
argues that the former is preferred in order to remedy the theoretical 
inconsistencies in the current body of law. 
 
 194. See Casido, supra note 15, at 338; Kulik, supra note 1, at 107 (“In a number of appellate 
decisions it has been recognized that actual use will rarely, if ever, be susceptible of proof by 
direct evidence. Instead, ‘use’ of the idea by the defendant is almost always proven 
circumstantially.”). 
 195. Benay, 607 F.3d at 629; Blaustein, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 334. 
 196. See supra text accompanying notes 44–51. 
 197. Michaud & Tulquois, supra note 9, at 77. 
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A.  Novelty as to the Recipient 
The first proposed solution alters the idea-disclosure analysis 
performed in implied-in-fact contract disputes. Stated plainly, 
California courts should presume that the parties negotiated the 
implied-in-fact contract on the following terms: the idea purveyor 
promised to disclose an idea that was novel as to the recipient in 
exchange for payment from the recipient in the event of actual use. 
The additional presumption of “novelty as to the recipient” better 
protects idea recipients from multiple lawsuits for the same idea 
submission, while still protecting the idea purveyors’ right to enforce 
a specifically negotiated contract for the disclosure of an idea that 
was not novel. 
“Novelty as to the recipient” is not to be confused with 
unqualified novelty.
198
 This proposed standard would establish that a 
common and unoriginal idea, as long as it was unknown to the idea 
recipient prior to disclosure, would satisfy the terms of the implied-
in-fact contract.
199
 The functional result of this standard would be to 
protect an idea recipient from accumulating contractual obligations 
with every party who pitched him the “same” idea. He or she would, 
therefore, be bound only to compensate the first idea purveyor in the 
event of actual use, for that purveyor would have been the only one 
who satisfied the contractual term of novelty as to the recipient. 
It is also important to note that this proposed term is merely a 
rebuttable presumption; it is malleable depending on the factual 
circumstances and will not stand as a complete bar to a plaintiff’s 
recovery. Unlike a required element that ideas be novel as to the 
world before one can even establish his or her prima facie case,
200
 a 
presumption just shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff to 
overcome the presumed term of novelty as to the recipient. 
Therefore, it is a lesser burden on the plaintiff in two respects: (1) 
either novelty must only be shown as to one person instead of the 
whole world or (2) the nonnovelty contractual term must be 
 
 198. Melville B. Nimmer, The Law of Ideas, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 119, 147 (1954). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Kulik, supra note 1, at 102 (“[T]he notion that novelty is not a prerequisite is a major 
distinction between California law and New York law, which continues to require novelty and 
originality.”); see also Miller, supra note 1, at 727 (“[A]rticulations of the novelty requirement 
establish a threshold barrier demonstrating a longstanding unwillingness to allow the factfinding 
function of an actual trial to take place.”). 
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established, rather than not even being an option. Further, this 
proposed presumption merely acts as a tool for better administering 
legal relief as a tribunal attempts to identify the terms of a contract, 
rather than as an inappropriate inquiry into the adequacy of the 
consideration between contracting parties.
201
 
As one court stated, “There is nothing unreasonable in the 
assumption that a producer would obligate himself to pay for the 
disclosure of an idea which he would otherwise be legally free to 
use, but which in fact, he would be unable to use but for the 
disclosure.”
202
 The alternate view presented here is that there is 
similarly nothing unreasonable in the assumption that a producer 
would obligate himself to pay only for the disclosure of an idea with 
which he was not already familiar.
203
 Further, upon an adequate 
evidentiary showing, a plaintiff could still rebut the presumption and 
establish that the contract was for the disclosure of an idea not novel 
to the recipient. The idea of a presumed term, rather than an absolute 
term, acknowledges and respects that where there is a contract for an 
idea, which does not by its terms require novelty, there is no 
justification for imposing such a term.
204
 
If California courts adopt this presumed term into the analytical 
framework of a Desny claim, the independent-creation defense will 
become logically sound. Whichever idea purveyor contracts with the 
recipient first—i.e., discloses his idea to the recipient first—will be 
the only party to whom the recipient owes compensation in the event 
of actual use, for only the first party will have satisfied the term of 
novelty as to the recipient. Such an idea hearkens back to the 
common law protection afforded to land owners in a real property 
dispute, in that “first in time is first in right.”
205
 
Of course, the concern of idea purveyors will be that such a 
presumption will be impossible to overcome. Arguably, any idea 
 
 201. In California, it is well settled that the conveyance of an idea can serve as valid 
consideration, regardless of novelty or concreteness. Literary and Artistic Property, supra note 9, 
§ 16; see also Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 273 (Cal. 1956) (“It is not essential to recovery that 
plaintiff's story or synopsis possess the elements of copyright protectibility [sic] if the fact of 
consensual contract be found.”). 
 202. Blaustein v. Burton, 88 Cal. Rptr. 319, 334 (Ct. App. 1970). 
 203. See Stanley v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 221 P.2d 73, 85 (Cal. 1950) (Traynor, J., 
dissenting). 
 204. See Nimmer, supra note 198, at 145. 
 205. See United States v. City of New Britain, Conn., 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954). 
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recipient could escape a contractual obligation by simply claiming 
that he was already familiar with the idea, especially if it is a well-
known idea. The effect of this presumed term is not intended, 
however, to allow an idea recipient to shield himself from all 
liability. Rather, it only protects the recipient from undeserved 
liability where he or she has not actually used the plaintiff’s idea. As 
such, it is a method for shielding idea recipients from liability to 
multiple idea purveyors. 
A plaintiff can simply rebut the idea recipient’s claim of 
nonnovelty by pointing to the mere fact that the defendant chose to 
use the idea subsequent to disclosure.
206
 This temporal element will 
evidence that the idea was novel as to the recipient, because he had 
not used it before disclosure.
207
 As has been recognized in California 
courts, the timing of an idea disclosure can be the very element that 
imbues value on the underlying idea.
208
 If a jury then refuses to 
recognize that a plaintiff’s idea was novel to and actually used by the 
defendant, it seems only fitting that the plaintiff would not be entitled 
to recover in that instance. If a plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence to 
persuade a reasonable jury to find in his or her favor, a denial of 
relief would not be unjust. 
B.  Fractional Damage Awards 
The second proposed solution leaves the entirety of the 
California law of ideas intact but, instead, modifies the effect of the 
independent-creation defense. As it stands today, a successful 
defense is a complete bar to a plaintiff’s recovery.
209
 However, as 
established above, this unlawfully extinguishes some valid 
contractual claims.
210
 The proposition here is that the effect of an 
independent-creation defense should be modeled after the tort 
concept of pure comparative negligence, which would offer 
 
 206. See Nimmer, supra note 198, at 146. 
 207. An idea recipient might argue that such a “timing” model places an undue burden on the 
idea recipient to read all idea submissions to avoid possible liability if he independently 
developed a similar show subsequent to receipt. This is easily remedied, however, by requiring 
that idea purveyors sign industry-standard releases, relinquishing their rights and acknowledging 
that no implied-in-fact contract has been created by mere submission. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra 
note 4, § 19D.10; Brophy, supra note 2, at 526–27. 
 208. Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 130, 134 (Ct. App. 1966). 
 209. Kulik, supra note 1, at 108. 
 210. See supra text accompanying notes 85–90. 
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proportional relief to both parties.
211
 Although such a solution does 
not remedy the legal inconsistencies discussed in this Note and is 
therefore less effective, it at least equitably distributes the burdens 
imposed under the current state of the law. 
If the plaintiff establishes the existence of his implied-in-fact 
contract and further gains the inference of actual use, it logically 
follows that he is entitled to recovery. If the defendant then 
establishes, via independent creation, that he has contracted with 
another party for the same idea, it logically follows that he could 
escape a proportion of his obligation to the plaintiff based on the 
amount that he actually used both his independent, third-party idea 
and the plaintiff’s idea. The court would, of course, present this 
question to the jury to assess the degrees to which each idea was 
used in creating the final offending work.
212
 
Implementing such a system would strike a compromise 
between the interests of both idea purveyors and idea recipients, for 
it affords the purveyor protection and protects the recipient from 
unreasonably paying multiple damages for the same conduct.
213
 The 
frequent method for damage calculation in idea-submission claims is 
restitution.
214
 If a court determines the amount that a plaintiff is 
entitled to recover by the amount that his idea enriched a defendant, 
then it is fitting that he should only be able to recover the precise 
amount that his idea actually enriched the defendant. It is not 
 
 211. Under a system of pure comparative negligence, when calculating damages in a 
negligence action, responsibility and liability for damage are assigned in direct proportion to the 
amount of negligence of each of the parties. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (Cal. 
1975). The result of applying this system is that “the damages awarded shall be diminished in 
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.” Id. An analogous 
system in implied-in-fact contract recovery would then award damages to a plaintiff in proportion 
to the amount of actual use of his idea that is attributable to the defendant, while relieving the 
defendant of any further liability to that party. The remaining “actual idea use” liability would be 
attributable to either the defendant’s use of his own idea or his use of a third party’s idea. For 
example, if one idea with three sources is used by one defendant, he will be held liable to each of 
the three idea purveyors in proportion to the amount he actually used each plaintiff’s idea. 
 212. See id. at 1240. 
 213. “At issue in every idea submission case are the interests of two competing classes: those 
who conceive and submit ideas and those who receive and use them. Inevitably, decisions must 
chart a course that balances the rights and obligations of each class.” NIMMER & NIMMER, supra 
note 4, § 19D.07[A]. 
 214. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 42 (2011); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371 (2010); see Kulik, supra note 1, at 108. 
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necessary that recovery in these cases be an all-or-nothing 
proposition. 
Idea recipients might be staunchly opposed to such a solution 
because they would have no way of truncating litigation—and 
litigation costs—by prevailing in a suit at the summary judgment 
phase. However, as mentioned above, there are standard industry 
practices that protect idea recipients from litigation in the first 
place—releases.
215
 One cannot overlook that the only reason that 
there is room for a plaintiff to bring an idea theft claim is, generally, 
because a defendant did not take steps to protect himself in the first 
place. The answer to eliminating litigation costs for the idea 
recipients, who are the unwilling participants in such suits, is not to 
eliminate the idea purveyor’s right to file suit, but rather to 
incentivize the idea recipient to (1) avoid unlawfully using a 
plaintiff’s ideas and (2) take anticipatory steps to protect himself. 
In addition, the idea purveyor is in no position to protect herself, 
for it is rare that a network executive would ever agree to sign a 
nondisclosure or confidentiality agreement.
216
 The entertainment 
industry is already difficult enough to break into, and any network, 
when faced with resistance from an idea purveyor, would simply 
forego the submission and move on to the next of the thousand ideas 
coming across its desks.
217
 As between the innocent idea purveyor 
and the network, the network is the party that has caused harm by 
using the idea without compensation, and thus it should incur the 
loss. To hold otherwise would unjustly enrich the defendant network 
for the value of the idea purveyor’s services. 
Economically speaking, imposing “comparative liability” for 
failure to pay contracted idea purveyors will have the positive effect 
of incentivizing networks to engage in negotiations and development 
with only those parties in whose ideas they have genuine interest. 
This will save many idea purveyors time and money, as they will be 
less likely to be misled by a network for years only to be met with 
rejection. Further, unless comparative liability is imposed on the 
networks, idea purveyors will be disincentivized from submitting 
ideas for fear of idea theft. There would be no recourse for breach of 
 
 215. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 19D.10; Brophy, supra note 2, at 526–27. 
 216. See Rubin, supra note 3, at 697–98. 
 217. See Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 280 (Cal. 1956) (Carter, J., concurring). 
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their implied-in-fact contracts in the wake of an independent-creation 
defense. The entertainment industry would collapse without the 
constant influx of fresh ideas, for, as the defendants will certainly 
agree, they rely on the contributions of idea purveyors for their 
economic survival.
218
 
Moreover, if there is no liability imposed for the breach of valid 
implied-in-fact contracts, the court would essentially be taxing a 
class of idea purveyors and forcing them to subsidize the idea 
recipients’ pursuit of new and fresh media programming. It is not 
unreasonable to ask entertainment companies to pay for the ideas that 
purveyors present to them and that lead to television programs and 
films. It is, however, unreasonable to deny the unfortunate person 
with a valid implied-in-fact contract his compensation because the 
network previously or subsequently contracted with another party for 
an identical idea.
219
 The law should not permit an idea recipient to 
simply choose which contractual obligations it will honor and which 
it will not. The court has a responsibility to uphold the freedom of 
contract and enforce an idea recipient’s contractual obligations to 
idea purveyors. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
If left unchanged, the protection that California courts afford to 
idea purveyors runs the risk of being both underinclusive and 
overinclusive due to its inconsistencies. Therefore, courts must adopt 
one of the above solutions. Only one of them seems to adequately 
protect the interests of both idea purveyors and recipients alike: 
novelty as to the recipient. The analytical framework of implied-in-
fact contracts must itself be changed in order to remedy the 
theoretical inconsistencies between the independent-creation defense 
and California idea law. Only then will businesses be able to 
structure their future ventures in order to avoid liability. Only then 
 
 218. See Brophy, supra note 2, at 508 (“[I]n the current media landscape dominated by reality 
television, a raw unscripted idea can have considerable value even before it is ever reduced to its 
final tangible expression.”); Miller, supra note 1, at 711–12. 
 219. See Desny, 299 P.2d at 267 (“The person who can and does convey a valuable idea to a 
producer who commercially solicits the service or who voluntarily accepts it knowing that it is 
tendered for a price should likewise be entitled to recover.”). 
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will future litigants be able to better strategize and predict the 
outcomes of their disputes. 
While fractional damage awards might enable parties to avoid 
paying multiple damages, the present theoretical inconsistencies 
would still remain. Idea recipients would potentially be locked into 
nuisance suits, and idea purveyors would potentially be denied 
rightful recovery because of a misapplied independent-creation 
defense. Moreover, parties would get no relief from their litigation 
costs if courts adopt such a solution. While fractional damage awards 
may appear just, in practice, litigants would be paying for the same 
number of billable hours only to be awarded or penalized with 
reduced damage awards or liabilities. 
In conclusion, through the incorporation of the presumed term of 
novelty as to the recipient, the independent-creation defense will gain 
theoretical validity in the context of California contract law. This 
solution will ensure that a defendant with a valid independent-
creation defense from a previous idea disclosure presumably escapes 
undue liability, while upholding the basic principles of contract. 
Likewise, idea purveyors will benefit, for no longer will the improper 
application of the independent-creation defense render their valid 
implied-in-fact contracts valueless. 
 
 
